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WHOSE MESSAGE WILL WIN THE SOULS?
 
THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS
LIFE IN CYBERSPACE AND ITS
“CHINESE CHARACTERISTIC”
by
PAVEL ŠINDELÁŘ*
The Internet has culminated in the development of tools for human communication  
that began with the appearance of languages and continued with the inventions of  
writing, typography, radio, and television, leading to the contemporary computer-
mediated communication. At each stage throughout history,  applying these new  
tools in human society changed its basic functions deeply. The sphere of religion  
was obviously not left outside these transformational  processes. With the rise of  
contemporary information technologies, radical changes on the religious scene can  
be predicted, parallel to those of communication revolutions in the past. It can be  
supposed that the religious traditions that will most effectively adapt to new tech-
nologies will be the most successful ones on the globalized market of world reli-
gions. Based on this observation, this article is trying to find features that should  
enable religious movements to succeed in this process. The main source for the pro-
gnosis originates in the research of the religious activities in the Chinese environ-
ment, especially those of the Falun Gong movement. As China will soon become the  
key actor  in  reshaping (not  only)  the  cyberspace  of  the future,  the  observations  
made in this environment can be an important inspiration for predicting the fur-
ther development of religious life on the entire Internet. 
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1. POST MAOIST CHINA AND FALUN GONG
At the end of the 1990´s, two seemingly independent processes flourished in 
China. Firstly, the Internet was spreading rapidly in a society where the in-
formation circuit  had previously been very limited and highly controlled. 
Secondly, religions were being revived after the period of strong repression 
in the time of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Both processes are rooted 
in economic and social reforms started by the pragmatics who took over 
political power after Mao’s concept of permanent socialistic revolution had 
failed. This paper tries to find an answer to the question: Whose Message 
Will Win the Souls? by examining the case of one concrete representative of 
Chinese post–reform religious revival and its co-development with the ICT 
communication.  This  analysis  should  suggest  which  forms  of  religious 
movements or communities have a chance to succeed on the current reli-
gious scene that is being globalized by the Internet.
The model religious movement that has been globally successful on the 
Internet and that can be used for some generalisations and predictions of fu-
ture development is Falun Gong.1 This movement developed from qigong 
communities popular during the 1980´s and 1990´s in the People’s Republic 
of  China.  Qigong  was  a  wide,  health-focused  phenomenon  based  on 
Chinese traditional medicine; and within it there appeared a stream gaining 
a strong religious appeal that corresponded with a general revival of earlier 
suppressed religiosity. This trend experienced its biggest popularity in the 
90´s under the name Falun Gong.2 Falun Gong was centred on the figure of 
its founder and the highest authority, Li Hongzhi, and according to some 
sources there were more than 100 million Falun Gong followers3. As a result 
of its popularity, a conflict between Falun Gong and the governing Commu-
nist Party that was consolidating its economic and political power started.
1 For more on the Falun Gong movement, its history and thoughts, see Chan, C. S. 2004, ‘The 
Falun Gong in China: A Sociological Perspective’,  China Quarterly vol. 179, pp. 665-683; 
Šindelář, P. 2005, Čína, síť a postmoderna. Cesta Falun Gongu do 21. století, (China, Net-
work and Postmodernity. Falun Gong’s Path into the 21st Century), Masaryk University, 
Brno (diploma thesis); Ownby, D. 2008, Falun Gong and the Future of China, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford; Chen, N. N. 2003, ‘Healing Sects and Anti-Cult Campaigns’ in Reli-
gion in China Today (The China Quarterly Special Issues, New Series, No. 3), ed D. Over-
myer, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 199-214; Tong, J. 2002, ‘An Organiza-
tional Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing’, China Quarterly, 
vol. 171, no. 4, pp. 636-660; Leung, B. 2002, ‘China and Falun Gong: Party and Society Rela-
tions in the Modern Era’, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 33, no. 11, pp. 761-784. 
2 For qigong movement history and Falun Gong’s position inside this broader phenomenon, 
see Ownby, D. 2008, Falun Gong and the Future of China, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
pp. 45-124. 
3 Tong, J. 2002, ‘An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, 
Financing’, China Quarterly, vol. 171, no. 4, pp. 642. 
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1.1. CONFLICT EVOLUTION
The relation between the Chinese government and the more and more self-
confident Falun Gong grew continuously tenser and resulted in a protest of 
the movement’s followers in front of the communist government’s residen-
tial area in the centre of Beijing in 1999.4 Chinese political representatives 
decided to treat Falun Gong as a threatening example; a massive propa-
ganda campaign against the movement was launched, accompanied by po-
lice repression and the introduction of legislative precautions to suppress 
not only Falun Gong but the whole stream of religious groups that would 
be labelled as New Religious Movements in the Western context. In this re-
spect, the new Chinese legislative and repressive policy can be considered 
very anti-cult.5 The aggressive policy succeeded fast and effectively in its 
aim to sweep Falun Gong (and other religious groups)6 out of Chinese soci-
ety. This became proof of the non-reformative character of religious politics 
inside a country experiencing dynamic changes of its social context. Surpris-
ingly, Falun Gong did not only survive this tremendous attempt of its bru-
tal liquidation, but it also reformed itself and used the situation to its ad-
vantage. And the Internet is the main factor that plays a key role in the fol-
lowing story of stand up and resistance.
In spite of its limitations in communist China, the Internet was experien-
cing a boom in Chinese urban middle-class society at the same time as Falun 
Gong did.  It  is  exactly this  level  of  society  from which the local  leaders  of 
Falun Gong were recruited. They consisted mainly of urban clerks, university 
students and staff, and interestingly also of lower Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) cadres. This organisational base quickly started to use the Internet as a 
4 It happened to be the biggest act of civil protests after the well-known Tiananmen Square 
events in 1989. The timing of the Falun Gong protest was problematic, as it fell exactly on 
the 10th anniversary of this highly sensitive historical event.
5 Anti-cult movements is a term used for individuals, groups or institutions which actively cri-
ticize particular representatives of New Religious Movements (NRM) from different posi-
tions. Although their argumentation is claimed to be part of academic discourse, their mo-
tivation and the goals that they follow originate in the sphere of politics, ideology or reli-
gion.  The  Chinese  state  uses  this  kind  of  agenda  developed  in  the  Western  world  to 
threaten uncomfortable and problematic religious groups in their own environment. Anti-
cult movements act very effectively on the Internet, as their counterpart NRM do. For more 
details  on  Anti-cult  movement  in  Cyberspace,  see  Introvigne,  M.  2000.  ‘”So  Many Evil 
Things”: Anti-cult Terrorism via the Internet’,  in Religion on the Internet:  Research Pro-
spects and Promises, ed. J. K. Hadden & D. E. Cowan, Elsevier Science, New York, pp. 277-
306 or Cowan, D. E. 2004, ‘Contested Spaces: Movement, Countermovement, and E-Space 
Propaganda’, in Religion Online: Finding Faith on the Internet, eds. L. L. Dawson, & D. E. 
Cowan, Routledge, New York, pp. 255-271. On general NRM and Internet interference see 
Cowan, D. E. & Hadden, J. F. 2004, ‘Virtually Religious. New Religious Movements and the 
World Wide Web’,  in The Oxford Handbook of the New Religious Movements, ed. J. R. 
Lewis, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 119-140. 
6 For example, the qigong movement of Zhong Gong (Thornton, P. M. 2003, ‘The New Cyber-
sects: resistance and repression in the reform era’, in Chinese Society. Change, Conflicts and 
Resistance, ed. M. Selden, RotledgeCurzon, London/New York, pp. 247-270), which is not 
well-known in the West, but very popular in the China of those days.
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highly utilized tool for communication (together with cell phones, faxes and 
other new communication technologies of those days) and for spreading their 
leader’s  thoughts.  One of  the issues that  helped the  leader,  Li  Hongzhi,  to 
dominate the competitive Chinese qigong scene was his emphasis on charge-
free spiritual revolution – something highly atypical of a society in transition 
from a communal Maoist society to a primitive form of wild capitalism. The 
Internet and a digitalised format of Li Hongzhi’s teaching (books, audio, video 
files with his lectures and with samples of basic physical exercises) was a very 
powerful instrument for spreading his popularity, especially in urban areas.
Therefore,  Falun  Gong  was  already  familiar  with  this  new space  for 
communication  and  proselytizing  at  the  crucial  point  of  its  crackdown. 
Even according to Chinese governmental security agencies, the organisation 
of the Falun Gong resistance act in front of the Communist headquarters in 
Beijing was so smooth, yet invisible, simply due to its effective use of ICT 
(mainly e-mails and cell phones). At this time, part of the movement’s “top 
management” was already operating abroad (Li Hongzhi himself,  for ex-
ample), which was a result of growing pressure from state apparatus and 
partly of Falun Gong’s popularity among the migrant population of over-
seas Chinese,  mainly in Hong Kong, Taiwan and the United States.  This 
base abroad was to become a source of revival activities after the violent 
crackdown of the movement in its  domestic  environment.  The followers, 
who were pushed into emigration or driven to private illegality in China by 
a  systematic  repression  campaign,  naturally  and spontaneously  gathered 
around the Internet as their new organisational structure. This Internet axis 
grew into a network of horizontally structured local cells connected through 
a sophisticated system of central web pages. The system has been serving as 
a global organisational structure since the movement’s defeat in China.  Its 
open and flexible form imitates the structure of the World Wide Web itself; 
on the other side there is quite a strict hierarchy governed by the authority of 
the leader who has established their new centre in New York’s Chinatown.7
1.2. FALUN GONG’S NEW
ORGANIZATIONAL CYBER-STRUCTURE 
It was the Internet which enabled a transformation of a numerous, but cul-
turally,  ethnically  and geographically  specific  Chinese  movement  into  a 
massive global and multicultural movement within a very short time.8 Cy-
berspace became Falun Gong’s organisational instrument that spread the re-
7 See Leung, B. 2002, ‘China and Falun Gong: Party and Society Relations in the Modern Era’, 
Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 33, no. 11, pp. 761-784; Lowe, S. 2003, ‘Chinese and In-
ternational Contexts for Rise of Falun Gong’ Nova Religio vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 263-276. 
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ligious movement all over the world; in addition, it became the main space 
for its activist and proselyte manoeuvres. In China, the war between the au-
thoritative state and the self-confident religious movement continues; both 
sides present their interpretations of 1999’s events to the world’s public and 
accuse the other side of all the guilt. These propaganda fights sometimes 
lead to various hacker or sabotage actions attacking the media of the other 
side. In contrast to the information situation inside China, where CCP has 
strong instruments to control information channels, the persecuted and op-
pressed Falun Gong followers have won sympathies on the global scene.9
However, the core of Falun Gong’s spiritual message, unlike their activ-
ist  ideological message, is firmly founded outside the huge galaxy of the 
Falun Gong web pages. Cyberspace serves mainly as a natural gathering 
place for its sympathizers, as an arena for opinion and personal experience 
exchanges and as an organisational and communicative headquarters. Fur-
thermore, the Internet works as a sphere for the citizen activism of Falun 
Gong  followers,  a  source  of  compassion  for  the  persecuted  community 
members,  a  place  reviving  resistance  towards  Chinese  governmental 
policies - that is, a space where Falun Gong’s identity is formed and where 
relations  to  its  spiritual  authorities  (Li,  his  teaching,  martyrs,  etc.)  are  
re-established. The Internet distributes thoughts and ideas inside the com-
munity as well as outside Falun Gong, in the surrounding, close and distant 
world.10 In spite of all its contributions, when considering the religious prac-
tice of Falun Gong, Cyberspace cannot be seen as being more than a com-
munication space connecting the local cells of a global religious net. Falun 
Gong’s religious practice, its ritual and its religious micro communities are 
located in the real world. They are to be found in urban parks, where they 
8 Actually, the multi-cultural character of Falun Gong as a global movement is quite disput-
able. According to a number of research projects in the United States, Canada, Europe and 
elsewhere, it seems that the core of Falun Gong adherents and especially of its leadership is 
still made up of ethnic Chinese based in the huge overseas communities. The non-Chinese 
follower segment creates a outer circuit of sympathizers that is more fluid and non-stable in 
its character (Zhao, Y. 2003, ‘Falun Gong, Identity, and the Struggle over Meaning inside 
and Outside China’, in Contesting Media Power. Alternative Media in a Networked World, 
eds.  N.  Couldry  &  J.  Curran,  Rowman  &  Littlefield  Publishers,  Lanham,  pp.  209-223; 
Ownby, D. 2002, ‘The Falun Gong in the New World’, European Journal of East Asian Stud-
ies, Brill, Leiden, pp. 303-320). 
9 To present its perspectives, Falun Gong handles with powerful and effective instruments, 
such as the Epoch Times publishing corporation, running its printed newspaper and news 
server (http://en.epochtimes.com/) that is frequently quoted in media world, lobbying in 
western governmental  institutions  and with individual  politicians  (http://www.clearwis-
dom.net/emh/special_column/recognition.html), etc. As an evidence of its successful activit-
ies, distribution of documents on physical suffering, experienced by FLG practitioners in 
China can be noted (see ‘Chalupecky Award’ winning project of Czech visual artist Ondřej 
Brody: http://brodypaetau.com/?page_id=79).
10 Parallel conclusions to my field research (cyberspace research included) have been attained 
by Ownby, D. 2008, Falun Gong and the Future of China, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
pp.200-211 or Bell,  M. R. & Boas, T. C. 2003, ‘Falun Gong and the Internet:  Evangelism, 
Community and Struggle for Survival’, Nova Religio, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 280-283. 
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do group qigong exercises; they attend study circles in private or public loc-
ations from Japan to Argentina. They are to be seen protesting in front of 
Chinese embassies in the world’s capitals or on the smaller town streets; all 
these actions attempt to draw attention to the suffering of their co-members 
and at the same time affirm their martyr global identity.
Those small or larger autonomous local communities could be in many 
respects mistaken for just another spiritual stream inspired by oriental reli-
gious traditions.11 However, there are features that differentiate this move-
ment from the unfocused and multiform scene,  features that define Falun 
Gong as a united, strongly self-identified and socially functioning commu-
nity and that enable Falun Gong to resist the most rapidly developing world 
power, China. The space and at the same time the tool creating an organism 
out of Falun Gong’s individual cells is the Internet. The movement has been 
using the Internet as a means of organisation, communication and ideologic-
al  war.  Nevertheless,  the essence of  its  religious  message  or the religious 
agenda itself is not directed at that space. Moving a certain type of Falun 
Gong’s activities to the Internet has not transformed the movement into a re-
ligious  community  whose  entire  activity  takes  place  exclusively  in  cyber-
space (Helland’s on-line religion).12 Undeniably, the centre of Falun Gong’s 
religious life is outside of virtual space; for the practising followers, the most 
important elements of Falun Gong are individual or group qigong exercises, 
the study of master  Li’s  texts  and a personal cultivation according to the 
zhan - shan - ren (truth - compassion - tolerance) principles.13 The movement 
does not exist in cyberspace as a whole, but it works as an organisation due 
to cyberspace, and its specific religious community is defined via cyberspace. 
1.3. BUILDING THE WEB-CHURCH
Today, the global web of Falun Gong has a firmly established structure that 
has evolved over the years and where a certain hierarchy has been formed. 
11 As an example, books on the topic of qigong or Chinese medicine/spirituality from more 
general perspective, including Falun Gong qigong exercises into its survey. E.g. Růžička, R. 
& Sosík, R. 2008, Čchi-kung. Cesta ke zdraví a dlouhověkosti, (Qigong. The Journey to the 
Health and Longevity), Poznání, Olomouc, pp.139-162. 
12 Later in the text, see a criticism of this Helland´s classification and its popularity among re-
searchers of religiosity in Cyberspace. The original classification was introduced in Helland, 
C. 2000, ‘Online religion/Religion Online and Virtual Communitas’, in Religion on the Inter-
net: Research Prospects and Promises, eds. J. K. Hadden & D. E. Cowan, Elsevier Science, 
New York, pp. 205-223.For a frequently quoted and similar classification, see Karaflogka, A. 
2002, ‘Religious Discourse and Cyberspace’, Religion vol. 32, pp. 284-286. 
13 The roots  of  FLG’s  spiritual  message come from traditional Chinese  religious  traditions 
(Taoism, Buddhism, popular religion, etc.) For further information on FLG’s sources of in-
spiration, see Šindelář, P. 2005, Čína, síť a postmoderna. Cesta Falun Gongu do 21. století, 
(China, Network and Postmodernity. Falun Gong’s Path into the 21st Century), Masaryk 
University, Brno (diploma thesis), pp. 15-18, 40-48. 
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This development was probably most influenced by events happening after 
the separation of a heretical Hong Kong group led by Belinda Peng Shan-
Shan, who used to be a contact person for the local branch of Falun Gong. 
This group separated from the Hong Kong branch after the leader Li Hong-
zhi disappeared from public because of the development in 1999. The group 
declared themselves  the new leaders  of  the entire  movement and estab-
lished their own web pages to confirm this position, to present their ideas 
and to proclaim it to other members. The control centre of Falun Gong rep-
resented by the New York group with the direct connection to Li reacted 
promptly. They stated that Belinda Peng and her group were misguided, 
governed by demonic powers and instructed from Beijing; these arguments 
were supported by the announcement by master Li himself, published on 
the New York group web pages.14 During the summer of 2000, Falun Gong’s 
centre  rebuilt  the  previously  ephemeral  structure  of  the  movement’s  as-
sembled individual web pages and placed the web page Minghui Net in its 
centre  (in  Chinese  at  www.minghui.org,  in  English  at  www.clearwis-
dom.org). This web published Li Hongzhi’s appeal to his followers ”On Im-
portant Matters, Practitioners Must Watch the Position of Minghui Net“, in 
which the ”Teacher“ also approved this new hierarchical form of the Falun 
Gong web pages.15 In Li’s physical absence, the web page works as the main 
authority of the movement; all of the important texts, new regulations and 
appeals to the followers are there. Through this page, Li communicates with 
his  followers  in  the  so  called  jingwen  form  (“authoritative”  or  “classic 
texts”). The texts are presented to public exclusively on this web and some 
of them even have a crucial importance for the movement and its teachings. 
As a result, the factual power over the movement today is concentrated in 
the hands of the server administrators of Minghui.org, who are members of 
the previously mentioned New York group connected to master Li. In spite 
of his indisputable spiritual authority for the whole movement, Li’s actual 
influence in this group and the intensity of his activities in the everyday 
running of Falun Gong remain quite unclear for the public and for the re-
searchers. It is the authority of the noted web pages that name the move-
ment’s priorities,  shape its campaigns, publish daily reports and if neces-
sary clarify or correct the misapprehensions of Falun Gong’s line.
Besides the Minghui Net, the movement runs a number of other, no less 
important web pages. The web www.falundafa.org serves as a gate to the 
14 More on this heresy case, see Fisher, G. 2003, ‘Resistance and Salvation in Falun Gong: The 
Promise and Peril of Forbearance’, Nova Religio, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 294-311). 
15 Bell, M. R. & Boas, T. C. 2003, ‘Falun Gong and the Internet: Evangelism, Community and 
Struggle for Survival’, Nova Religio, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 282. 
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interwoven Falun Gong net; it enables access to the basic texts by Li Hong-
zhi and informs about the movement’s history, activities and motivations 
for activism. The information given here is only brief, and the links to other 
web pages play a more important  role.  The links  lead to pages that  are 
either global ones specialising in specific topics or focusing on specific tar-
get groups or represent branches of Falun Gong in specific countries. The 
branches´ web pages provide further information on activities in respective 
national  languages,  translate  the content  of  the global  pages  and inform 
about events in a specific location.
Due to this complex and entwined net of interlinking webs, it is often 
difficult to decide whether a web page is run directly by Falun Gong or by 
an independent organisation fighting for human rights in China in general. 
According to Dawson and Hennebry, in this  case the Internet works as  
a special kind of loop where a person interested in certain related topics is 
always  being  linked,  returned  and  readdressed  to  Falun  Gong’s  web 
pages.16 A parallel to a real net exists in which, according to the rules and lo-
gic of the Internet surfing/fishing, the best possible catch appears every day. 
The multiplicity of independent Falun Gong web pages scattered on servers 
around the whole world provides an effective prevention against outside 
interventions (hacking attacks, server blockage) as well as readiness to ac-
tion.17 Still,  in the seemingly free and individually working net structure, 
there is the hierarchy and ideological centre in Minghui Net that ensures the 
unity of the structure and confirms the identities of particular elements by 
the highest Falun Gong authority – Master Li Hongzhi. 
2. RULES OF CHINESE CYBERSPACE
The Falun Gong case gives not only an opportunity to notice the changes the 
religious movement has undergone when faced with cyberspace, but also to 
observe  an  otherwise  quite  rare  situation  when  a  religious  movement 
changes the form of cyberspace itself. The phenomenon of Falun Gong and 
its activities on the Internet, which overlapped with the rapid development 
of  this  media in China,  influenced the development  and establishment of 
today’s local information net, which is strongly controlled and geared by the 
Chinese state. With regard to the earlier prognosis, the Internet should have 
brought free access to information and freedom of speech to China, which 
would have further led to introducing human rights and freedoms usual in 
16 Dawson, L. L. & Hennebry J. 2004,  ‘New Religions and the Internet: Recruiting in a New 
Public Space’, in Religion Online: Finding Faith on the Internet, eds. L. L. Dawson, & D. E. 
Cowan, Routledge, New York, pp. 160. 
17 Bell, M. R. & Boas, T. C. 2003, ‘Falun Gong and the Internet: Evangelism, Community and 
Struggle for Survival’, Nova Religio, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 280 
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the western world to Chinese society.18 The fact that this development has at 
least been delayed can be easily based on the observation that multinational 
companies like Microsoft, Yahoo or Google have free willingly agreed to cen-
sor the Internet, to prevent searching for ”inappropriate“ web links in their 
search engines and to inform about the contents of their users’ blogs, as their 
priority is to establish their position on the expanding Chinese market.
In today’s form of the Internet in China, the state benefits from all its ad-
vantages (especially in business and entrepreneurship, but in education, sci-
ence and administration as well); simultaneously, the state can eliminate its 
dangers and threads to the laboriously built political status quo. It was the 
“Internet war” between Falun Gong and the governmental apparatus, espe-
cially its most brutal phase in the first years after the movement’s ban in 
China,  which  inspired  the  elaboration  of  the  controlled  system  of  the 
present day.19 The main tools used in this system are, firstly, closing the net 
from the outside world (the so-called Great Chinese  Wall) and secondly, 
monitoring and censoring within the country’s borders.20 A number of scep-
tical  observers  anticipate  the  moment  when,  instead  of  the  free  western 
form of the Internet effecting Chinese political culture, Chinese Internet in-
ventions would rather be used in the environment of the practically unregu-
lated Internet in the west. Nevertheless, the Internet is neither an all-solving 
instrument for spreading freedom and equality nor an instrument of abso-
lute control leading to the establishment of an authoritative society. C. R. 
Huges  stated  that  the  Internet,  just  like  any  other  technology,  is  not  
a free-standing entity, but rather only a tool reflecting a current state of soci-
ety and its culture.21 There is no need to be afraid of possibilities to control 
and steer events in cyberspace which had been until recently considered to 
18 These expectations are illustrated by two statements of former US presidents - Bill Clinton: 
“...cracking down on the internet in PRC is like trying to nail Jello to the wall.” (Bell, M. R. & Boas, 
T. C. 2003, ‘Falun Gong and the Internet: Evangelism, Community and Struggle for Surviv-
al’, Nova Religio, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 288) and George W. Bush: “Imagine if the Internet took hold  
in China. Imagine how freedom would spread.”( Kalathil, S. & Boas, T. C. 2003, Open Networks, 
Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Washington, pp. 13) 
19 For more detailed information on cyberspace fights between FLG and the Chinese state, see 
Šindelář, P. 2005, Čína, síť a postmoderna. Cesta Falun Gongu do 21. století, (China, Net-
work and Postmodernity. Falun Gong’s Path into the 21st Century), Masaryk University, 
Brno (diploma thesis), pp. 81-82). 
20 On the specific situation of the Internet in China, Internet censorship and future perspect-
ives, see e.g. Kalathil, S. & Boas, T. C. 2003, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of 
the Internet on Authoritarian Rule, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washing-
ton; Hughes, C. R. 2004, ‘Controlling the Internet Architecture within Greater China’, in Cy-
ber China. Reshaping National Identities in the Age of Informational, ed. F. Mengin, Pal-
grave MacMillan, New York, pp. 71-90; Hartford, K. 2000, ‘Cyberspace with Chinese Char-
acteristic’, Current History vol. 99, no. 638, pp 255-262; Giese, K. 2004, ‘Speaker‘s Corner or 
Virtual Panopticon: Discursive Construction of Chinese Identities Online’ in Cyber China. 
Reshaping National Identities in the Age of Informational, ed. F. Mengin, Palgrave MacMil-
lan, New York, pp. 19-36. 
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be an embodiment of freedom and liberalism. It is more important to take 
into consideration the directions and tendencies of the changes happening 
in present Chinese society. In spite of all the restrictions, the Internet is still 
one of the freest locations for expressing ideas and looking for information 
in China. That is one of the reasons that attract even many representatives 
of the Chinese grey zone to participate and communicate in cyberspace.22
3. DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
When describing the growing process of a specific religious group in cyber-
space, some important findings appear. These are regularities that play a 
crucial role in the transformations a society undergoes, including its reli-
gions, of course, as a result of a new communication model using the Inter-
net.  A deeper analysis  of those regularities is  needed for any further re-
search on the functioning of religions in cyberspace. The key issues would 
be analysing transformations of religious institutions, religious authorities, 
religious  communities  and personal  identities  of  religious  groups’  mem-
bers, following their inhabitation of cyberspace.23 Furthermore, questions of 
individualisation or personalisation of religious life arising from its re-cre-
ation on the Internet or the ways in which various religious groups influ-
ence or change the new medium could be discussed.
Falun Gong in its current form is a movement that has succeeded be-
cause of the Internet and despite the huge effort invested to stop the move-
ment. Falun Gong recovered its strength quickly and effectively; it evolved 
from a huge religious community existing in one country, focusing on its 
typical  citizens and operating with not easily  adaptable Chinese cultural, 
philosophical and religious patterns into a multinational, effectively organ-
ized net of cells practicing religious activities in small local communities. 
21 Hughes, C. R. 2004, ‘Controlling the Internet Architecture within Greater China’, in Cyber 
China. Reshaping National Identities in the Age of Informational, ed. F. Mengin, Palgrave 
MacMillan, New York, pp. 71-90. 
22 Compare to  Chen,  N.  N.  2003,  ‘Healing Sects  and Anti-Cult  Campaigns’  in  Religion  in 
China Today (The China Quarterly Special  Issues,  New Series,  No. 3),  ed D. Overmyer, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 199-214; Clarke, J. 2007, ‘Communing on the 
Internet: Chinese Catholics and their Various Uses of the Web’, Asian Studies Review, vol. 
31,  pp.459-470;  Dunn,  C.  E.  2007,  ‘Netizens  of  Heaven:  Contesting  Orthodoxies  on  the 
Chinese Protestant Web’,  Asian Studies Review, vol. 31, pp. 447-458; Palmer, D. A. 2004, 
‘Cyberspace and the Emerging Chinese Religious Landscape–Preliminary Observations’ in 
Cyber China. Reshaping National Identities in the Age of Informational, ed. F. Mengin, Pal-
grave MacMillan, New York, pp. 37-50; Thornton, P. M. 2003, ‘The New Cybersects: resist-
ance and repression in the reform era’, in Chinese Society. Change, Conflicts and Resist-
ance, ed. M. Selden, RotledgeCurzon, London/New York, pp. 247-270.
23 See Dawson, L. L. 2004, ‘Religion and the Quest for Virtual Community’, in Religion Online: 
Finding Faith on the Internet, eds. L. L. Dawson, & D. E. Cowan, Routledge, New York, pp. 
75-89; O’Leary D. 2004, ‘Cyberspace as Sacred Space. Communicating Religion on Com-
puter Networks’, in Religion Online: Finding Faith on the Internet, eds. L. L. Dawson, & D. 
E. Cowan, Routledge, New York, pp. 37-58; Castells, M. 2001. The Internet Galaxy. Reflec-
tions on the Internet, Business and Society, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
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Additionally, these cells can be operated as a worldwide organisation, can 
influence global public opinion and are able to resist the biggest economic-
political power state of the present world.
Falun Gong and its history in cyberspace show a direction for future re-
search of the relation between religion and the Internet. In its beginnings, 
this research unfortunately split into two practically separate study subjects. 
The reason behind the separation was a search for classification instruments 
that  would handle the new subject,  cyberspace,  appropriately. There ap-
peared the by now classical division of religious activities into religion on-
line  and online  religion;  analogical  or  specifying  classifications  later  fol-
lowed.24 Although the division faced critical reactions, rejection and various 
alterations,25 it resulted in the establishment of two disciplines in the study 
of religions, neither of which are able to offer crucial solutions. None of the 
approaches suggests what influence the use of new information technolo-
gies will  have on religion as a general phenomenon nor describes its im-
pacts on particular religious systems, on communities, on the religious life 
of individuals, on religious identity in society or on the future religious map 
of the world. The first approach, based on the concept of religion online, un-
derstands the Internet as a new, effective, systematic and at the same time 
comfortable instrument for fieldwork which will replace old, more elabor-
ate and time-consuming methods in the research of religions. The second 
approach started to trace the mysterious and never seen ideal type of online 
religion. With excitement, it focuses on spare attempts to transport religious 
life from the offline world into cyberspace. This research mainly consists of 
descriptions and analyses of exotic online rituals, religious events in parallel 
online worlds and activities of charismatic leaders stuck in virtual reality. 
Undeniably, this  research is innovative, but due to a small proportion of 
those cases among the overall religious activities in Cyberspace, it can be 
seen as rather a waste of academic staff, their time and their resources. On 
the other hand, the conducted analysis of the Falun Gong activities on the 
Internet with their specific features shows other possible directions for sci-
entific examination of religious presence in cyberspace. 
24 Helland, C. 2000, ‘Online religion/Religion Online and Virtual Communitas’, in Religion on 
the Internet: Research Prospects and Promises, eds. J. K. Hadden & D. E. Cowan, Elsevier 
Science, New York, pp. 205-223; Karaflogka, A. 2002, ‘Religious Discourse and Cyberspace’, 
Religion vol. 32, pp. 284-286. Leung, B. 2002, ‘China and Falun Gong: Party and Society Re-
lations in the Modern Era’, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 33, no. 11, pp. 761-784. 
25 For representative criticism of Helland’s earlier classification, see Cowan, D. E. 2005, Cyber-
henge: Modern Pagans on the Internet, Routledge, New York or Young, G. 2004, ‘Reading 
and Praying Online:  The Continuity  of  Religion  Online  and Online Religion in Internet 
Christianity‘, in Religion Online: Finding Faith on the Internet, eds. L. L. Dawson, & D. E. 
Cowan, Routledge, New York, pp. 93-106.
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3.1. TECHNOLOGY CHANGING SOCIAL REALITY
The Internet is nothing more than a new communication tool. Human kind 
is getting used to handling this tool in a massive way, as it became used to 
other communication inventions in the past. The Internet of today is just a 
culmination of previous developments in human communication. This evol-
utionary line started with the appearance of language, continued with the 
inventions of writing, typography, radio, and television,  and leads to the 
contemporary  computer-mediated  communication.  At  each  stage 
throughout human history, the application of new tools in human society 
changed its basic functions and influenced its development. The sphere of 
religion was obviously not left outside this transformation process. In cor-
respondence to the rise of contemporary information technologies, radical 
changes on the religious scene, parallel to those connected with communica-
tion revolutions of the past, can be predicted. Based on this presumption, it 
can be suggested that religious traditions that will most effectively adapt to 
the new communication technologies will  be the most successful ones on 
the future globalized market of world religions. There is a popular parallel 
to the success Protestantism achieved thanks to Gutenberg’s printing ma-
chine 400 years ago in Christian Europe. 
Regarding the changes caused by accepting the Internet as a key instru-
ment for communication on the religious scene, there are two basic sets of 
questions that need to be discussed:
What changes inside religious traditions/communities/practices/functions 
result from the use of the new communication instrument, the Internet?
What form of religious communities/streams/traditions has the biggest 
chance to profit from using the new communication tool, and why is this so? 
3.2. INSPIRATION IN FALUN GONG’S DEVELOPMENT
The example of the Falun Gong movement that, thanks to the Internet, suc-
ceeded,  survived its  almost certain death,  spread all  over  the world and 
continues in its activities on the Internet effectively; but the fact that it at the 
same time had to change its features, functions and form in a quite funda-
mental way can offer some answers, or rather predictions.
Traditions which oppose the opinions of a majority or which face a power-
ful opposing subject show a higher level of success (in relevance to their size, 
influence and popularity in society). This is not only valid in totalitarian re-
gimes such as China, but applies globally – for instance the radical Islamic 
fundamentalists operating in cyberspace or some new religious movements 
appearing in strongly anti-cult societies. These groups succeed on the Internet 
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because they almost destroy their ineffective offline hierarchy structures and 
replace them with a net structure imitating the structure of the Internet itself. 
Comparably successful movements that have been successful because they ac-
cepted the network logic can be found outside the religious sphere, among 
various  activist  groups,  neo-Nazis,  musicians  gaining  popularity  through 
MySpace or even in Barack Obama campaigning. The main strategy of these 
movements is to combine their strong local activity with effective communic-
ation and promotion at a global level – through the Internet.
Another important prerequisite that helps individual religious movements 
to succeed is their ideological or functional closeness to cyberspace. As an ex-
ample, the success of new religions such as New Age can be cited. This broad 
stream of religiosity implies an individual approach to religion and a syncret-
ic attitude to spirituality. New Age religious streams are often based on a free 
choice of dogmas, identities or authorities contrasting with the determination 
by the environment or society an individual was born into – there is a kind of 
deterritorialisation of religion.26 The choice, freedom, transformation of tradi-
tional authorities, identity switch and deterritorialisation are all concepts typ-
ical of the Internet as well. The correspondence between the concepts of the 
Internet and New Age is not surprising, as they are both products of the same 
generation – American counterculture of the 1960´s.
Falun Gong’s case also offers provisional answers to the question, “What 
will  change  in  a  religion  once  its  communication  is  moved  into 
cyberspace?” Again, this issue can be perceived from a more general per-
spective because the problems of religion in cyberspace are an integral part 
of the changes the whole society undergoes. At the same time, the following 
predictions are highly hypothetical and should act rather as a set of direc-
tions for further research of future forms on the global religion scene. Most 
probably, changes will appear in the understanding of (religious) identity, 
(religious) community and its functions, (religious) authorities and their in-
fluence, (religious) institutions and their organisation, and the spreading of 
(religious) messages and information. The religious identity will  be more 
easily adaptable, more flexible and shared across continents without prob-
lems. The religious communities will  be deterritorialised, and their struc-
tures and functioning principles will change. There will be a crisis of tradi-
tional religious authorities and new ones will appear; authorities’ validity 
and confirmation will be based on principles different from the traditionally 
approved ones. Religious institutions will transform into global nets and the 
26 Mayer, J-F. 2003, ‘Religion and the Internet. The global marketplace’, in Challenging Reli-
gion. Essays in Honour of Eileen Barker, eds. J. A. Beckford & J. T. Richardson, Routledge, 
New York, pp. 39-41. 
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spreading of their message and their mutual communication will be hap-
pening in a net form as well. Such development can lead to the dominance 
of new forms of religiosity and to the appearance of brand new religious 
traditions, but it can also cause the reshaping and resurrection of traditional 
religious groups and societies.27
Not all these predictions will definitely come true; furthermore, there is
a possibility that as a negative reaction to widespread Internet communica-
tion, a movement rejecting its logic and rules and standing in opposition to 
the Internet will succeed globally. The (hypothetical) success of such a move-
ment would actually also be influenced by the introduction of the new com-
munication tool. So far, using the Internet for spreading ideas and commu-
nicating has been successfully employed even by a number of fundamental-
ist, tradition-reviving and modern society-criticising religious streams28.
4. CONCLUSION
The case of a specific  movement that developed from particular  Chinese 
conditions into a global organisation might seem to be too exact to be used 
for general observations and analysis of a global change of religions caused 
by the Internet. It has been explained that China and its cyberspace is a very 
specific environment, strongly regulated and yet rapidly growing. The same 
situation is there on the Chinese religious scene. It is difficult to compare the 
situation to Euro-American society, where the Internet density is quite high, 
its regulation quite low and where the religious scene has been quite static 
for centuries. However, cyberspace needs to be considered as a global net 
and cannot  be  mistaken  for  an English  speaking  cyberspace.  There  are  
a  number  of  cyberspaces  next  to  each other,  being  rather  separate29 and 
communicating  with  other  cyberspaces  according  to Chinese  rather  than 
Western rules. Even the global religious scene – strongly regulated and dy-
namically developing – more closely resembles the situation in China than 
the situation in Euro-American conditions. That is why it can be beneficial 
to search for an answer to the question, “Who will succeed in the global reli-
gious arena?” in the environment of Chinese cyberspace.
27 See Mayer, J-F. 2003, ‘Religion and the Internet. The global marketplace’, in Challenging Re-
ligion. Essays in Honour of Eileen Barker, eds. J. A. Beckford & J. T. Richardson, Routledge, 
New York, pp. 36-46. 
28 E.g. an autonomous Czech NRM ”Vesmírní lidé”-  www.vesmirnilide.cz (English version 
available at www.universe-people.cz). 
29 They are mostly defined by a used language. The transition of information between cyber-
spaces is not as obvious as many theoreticians of the global informational network expec-
ted. Next to the English speaking network there is not just the Chinese one, but also a Russi-
an one, a Japanese one, a Spanish one and many others. Interestingly enough, FLG man-
aged to penetrate most of them. See  www.falungdafa.org and the language possibilities it 
offers.
